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The Direction and Scope of Social Policy
Change: Regime-speciﬁc or Radical Shift
towards Workfare?
BARBARA VIS
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT What is the direction and scope of social policy change? This article assesses the
predictions and ﬁndings of two strands of literature: ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy analysis, which
suggests the absence of radical change and the dependence of change on the type of welfare
regime; and the regulation literature, which proposes a radical change from welfare towards
workfare that does not hinge on the type of welfare regime. This article’s systematic comparative
analysis of 17 OECD countries between 1985 and 2002 provides mixed evidence for both
accounts.
Introduction
What is the direction and scope of social policy change? There is a widespread
consensus in the literature about the socio-economic challenges contemporary
welfare states face, such as ageing populations and the post-industrialization of
labour markets, as well as about the pressures for change that these challenges bring
about. However, there is a striking lack of consensus about the resultant direction
and scope of social policy change (see Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, Pierson 2001,
Gilbert 2002, Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002, Myles and Quadagno 2002, Van
Kersbergen 2002, Castles 2004, Starke 2006). Within the various literatures dealing
with comparative social policy, at least two clashing views are discernable.
First, a key hypothesis in one body of work is the notion that the direction and
scope of social policy change depend on the type of welfare state regime, that is the
cluster of countries with a distinct political and policy conﬁguration that produces a
trajectory that is diﬃcult to abandon (liberal, conservative, or social democratic;
Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999, see Pierson 2001). Note that the notion of path
dependence is not an argument against chance per se. As Pierson (2001: 415) stresses
‘‘the claim is not that path dependence ‘freezes’ existing arrangements in place.
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Change continues, but it is bounded change’’. Theoretically, the argument of regime-
speciﬁc change draws on insights from institutionalism. So a country’s institutional
make-up aﬀects the speciﬁc challenges it has to cope with, such as poverty in liberal
countries and ‘‘welfare without work’’ in conservative countries (see Esping-
Andersen 1996a, Stephens 1996, Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Additionally, this body
of work suggests that the institutional conﬁguration shapes or ‘‘refracts’’ (Kitschelt
et al. 1999) the pressures a country faces. Partly as a consequence, the stickiness of
institutions precludes ‘‘radical’’ change. Radical change, then, is change that is so
great that it overhauls a country’s institutional layout, like the transformation of a
pay-as-you-go pension system into a (fully) funded system.
This article labels this ﬁrst body of literature ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy analysis.
The term ‘‘mainstream’’ does not entail any qualitative judgement, but is used
because the hypotheses of regime-speciﬁc change and the absence of radical change
often provide the yardstick against which scholars assess their ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally,
researchers arguing against the path dependency and regime speciﬁcity of social
policy change regularly take these hypotheses as their starting point (for example
Cox 1998a, Lødemel and Trickey 2001, Gilbert 2002, Bannink and Hoogenboom
2007, but see Be´land and Hansen 2000). Hence, and notwithstanding scholars ﬁtting
this ‘‘mainstream’’ tradition who acknowledge that social policy has changed in
important respects such as being more severely subjected to the whims of the labour
market (for example Stephens 1996, Swank 2001), the absence of radical change and
the path dependent trajectory of change constitute key hypotheses of ‘‘mainstream’’
social policy analysis.
The second body of literature, the regulation approach to political economy,
competes with the ﬁrst as it hypothesizes that social policy has changed radically and
irrespective of the type of welfare regime. Speciﬁcally, the argument is that, as a
result of especially economic but also political and social pressures, there has been a
shift from welfare towards workfare (Jessop 1999, 2002, Torﬁng 1999, Peck and
Theodore 2000, 2001, Peck 2001). Somewhat diﬀerent from common usage, the
regulationists deﬁne welfare as the generalization of norms of mass consumption
beyond male workers and the promotion of mass production that supports
the (Fordist) growth dynamic,1 and workfare as the subordination of social policy
to the demands of labour market ﬂexibility and the competitiveness of business. The
welfare/workfare claim is a sub-hypothesis of this literature’s proposition of a
transformation from Keynesian welfare states (KWS) towards Schumpeterian
workfare regimes (SWR).2 As the SWR is (almost) the exact opposite of the KWS
(see Jessop 2002: Tables 2.1 and 7.1), a shift from one to the other constitutes a
radical change. Despite the diﬀerent types of workfare regimes that most
regulationists consider (Torﬁng 1999: 7, Peck 2001: 75–76, Jessop 2002: 260–267),
these scholars hypothesize a welfare to workfare shift on the level of social policy in
all regimes.
This article intends to solve this puzzle of competing theoretical predictions and
ﬁndings by assessing comparatively who is right. The ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy
analysts arguing that welfare state change is regime-speciﬁc and that radical change
has been absent? Or the regulationists positing that irrespective of the type of welfare
state, a radical shift from welfare towards workfare has come about? A comparative
analysis of 17 advanced capitalist democracies3 between 1985 and 2002 leads to
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mixed ﬁndings. In brief, the analysis shows that radical changes have occurred but
an overall welfare to workfare shift has not. These ﬁndings contradict both
literatures’ predictions. However, the regime speciﬁcity of most changes veriﬁes
(partially) the social policy analysts’ hypothesis. And the welfare to workfare shift
found in the conservative regime and Denmark corroborates (partially) the
regulationists’ thesis.
This article’s structure is as follows. Section two introduces the method used.
Section three discusses the conceptual confusion around the term workfare and
oﬀers an operationalization that allows for systematic comparative analysis. Section
four puts forward expectations of the shift towards workfare in the diﬀerent welfare
regimes. Section ﬁve studies comparatively if and to what extent a welfare to
workfare shift has taken place and whether this change hinges on the type of welfare
regime. Section six discusses the empirical ﬁndings. Section seven presents the
conclusion.
The Method
To assess the predictions and ﬁndings of the two literatures, this article conducts a
systematic comparative analysis. The reasons for such an analysis are several. First,
although comparative projects and large-n studies have corroborated the ‘‘main-
stream’’ social policy analysts’ propositions (see Esping-Andersen 1996b, Scharpf
and Schmidt 2000, Huber and Stephens 2001, Pierson 2001, Castles 2004), the exact
direction and scope of social policy change remain debated (for example Taylor-
Gooby 2004, Bruttel and Sol 2006). This article contributes to this debate by
proposing an innovative conceptualization and operationalization of workfare that
allows for examining comparatively and over a relatively large number of cases in
which direction social policy is changing. Moreover, the individual components of
this article’s operationalization of workfare (activation, generosity, conditionality,
and employment protection) provide additional information on the extent and shape
of social policy change. Furthermore, the analysis contributes to the discussion on
the path dependency of change by examining whether the changes found reveal a
regime-speciﬁc pattern.
Another reason for conducting a comprehensive comparative assessment is that,
contrary to the social policy analysts’ claims, the regulationists’ theoretical
predictions are not yet tested empirically. Actually, the regulation literature lacks
two things. First, it does not empirically test its welfare/workfare hypothesis and,
second, it does not conduct systematic comparative analyses. Peck’s (2001) edifying
analysis of the political economy of workfare in the UK, Canada, and the US, for
example, is – as Peck (2001: 7) states himself – no ‘‘formal and symmetrical piece of
comparative analysis per se’’ since he does not undertake ‘‘comprehensively
structured comparisons’’.
This article intends to ﬁll the voids of both bodies of literature by empirically
assessing the radical change and path dependency claims, using the most recent and
apt data available. The analysis focuses on the percentage change between 1985 and
2002. What justiﬁes this simple technique is that both the social policy analysts and
the regulationists hold that these countries were welfare states in 1985. In 2002,
however, this was still the case according to the former, whereas the countries had
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transformed into workfare regimes according to the latter.4 That is, if a radical
change from welfare to workfare did occur, it should show up between 1985 and
2002. Moreover, if social policy develops in a path dependent fashion, we should ﬁnd
such a pattern between these two years.
Workfare: Conceptualization and Operationalization
In the early 1970s, the term workfare originated in the United States to denote a
speciﬁc programme in which participants were required to ‘‘work oﬀ’’ their welfare
cheques.
Nowadays, the variety of workfare measures is wide and the meaning of workfare
is broad and quite elastic. Consequently, there currently is substantial conceptual
confusion around the term, mainly concerning how exactly it should be deﬁned (see
Grover and Stewart 1999: 76–77, Lødemel and Trickey 2001: 3–12, Peck 2001: 9–16,
Barbier 2004: 49–51).
The deﬁnitions of workfare employed in the two strands of literature central to
this study vary substantially. The regulationists usually adopt a wide deﬁnition of
workfare, characterizing it as the subordination of social policy to the demands of
labour market ﬂexibility and to the competitiveness of business. Jessop (2002: 258),
for example, speaks of ‘‘a major reorientation of social policy: away from
redistributive concerns based on expanding welfare rights in a national state
towards more productivist and cost-saving concerns’’ (see also Torﬁng 1999: 8).
More narrowly, Peck (2001: 10) states that workfare in its essence involves ‘‘the
imposition of a range of compulsory programmes and mandatory requirements for
recipients with a view to enforcing work while residualizing welfare’’ (italics original).
Instead of a programme, so the regulationists argue, workfare has become ‘‘the
institutional codiﬁcation of work-oriented welfare reform’’ (Peck 2001: 342).
‘‘Mainstream’’ social policy analysts, contrarily, often see workfare as a
programme. Speciﬁcally, these scholars usually deﬁne workfare narrowly as
mandatory supply-side social policies that intend to increase labour force
participation, enhance the ﬂexibility of the labour market, and lower public social
expenditures (see Scharpf and Schmidt 2000: 332, Kildal 2001: 3, Gray 2004: 160–
161). Lødemel and Trickey (2001: 6), for example, deﬁne workfare as ‘‘programmes
or schemes that require people to work in return for social assistance beneﬁts’’. For
them, the compulsion requirement is the key distinguishing feature of workfare
(Lødemel and Trickey 2001: 7–8). Whereas this compulsion requirement is widely
accepted among scholars studying workfare, Lødemel and Trickey’s (2001) focus on
‘‘work’’ and, especially, ‘‘social assistance’’ is more controversial. Concentrating on
work means that activation measures such as job training are excluded and these are
measures that many researchers consider as possibly qualifying as workfare (Grover
and Stewart 1999, Jessop 1999, Torﬁng 1999, Gray 2004, Bruttel and Sol 2006).
Moreover, for quite a few researchers, programmes related to social insurance –
instead of social assistance – can also come over as workfare (Peck and Theodore
2000, Peck 2001, Gray 2004, Bruttel and Sol 2006; see also Lødemel and Trickey
2001: 7–9).
For a number of reasons, this article adopts a wider conceptualization and
operationalization of workfare that is not exclusively linked to social assistance.
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First, the importance of social assistance within social security is relatively modest in
the conservative and social democratic regimes. Whilst in the liberal regime on
average almost a ﬁfth (17.2%) of the population receives (means-tested) social
assistance, this share is substantially lower (4.0% and 7.1%) in the conservative and
social democratic regimes. Besides, whereas the liberal regime spends on average
more than half (53.9%) of its total social security expenditure on social assistance,
this is only 7.1 and 6.4 per cent in the conservative and social democratic regimes
(Gough et al. 1997: 24). Furthermore, in some countries (such as Ireland, the UK,
Australia, and New Zealand) social assistance beneﬁts that are subject to the
availability-for-work criterion, hence ﬁtting the compulsion requirement of work-
fare, are called unemployment beneﬁts (OECD 2003: 215, n.1). Such programmes
would thus be excluded by concentrating on social assistance only. Finally, and
related, for example the Netherlands stopped distinguishing between recipients of
social assistance and unemployment assistance in its oﬃcial statistics from 1995
onwards (OECD 2003: 217, n.27; see also Cox 1998b: 408–409), and also in other
countries (such as Denmark and Germany) recent reforms have diminished the
distinction between unemployment assistance and social assistance (Cox 1998b: 405,
Kemmerling and Bruttel 2006).
Conceptualizing Workfare
For assessing the claim of a radical change from welfare towards workfare, we need
concepts that relate (strongly) to workfare and that the two bodies of literatures
share. Simply classifying every country with a workfare programme as a workfare
regime would, for example, be problematic as this would undermine the
regulationists’ idea of a Schumpeterian workfare regime. So, Australia, Denmark,
Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the
UK, and the US all have workfare programmes (see Kildal 2001, Lødemel and
Trickey 2001, Peck 2001, Waddan 2003, Gray 2004: 167–181; Aust and Arriba 2005;
Bruttel and Sol 2006), but that does not automatically mean they are workfare
regimes.
Notwithstanding the varying broadness in the deﬁnitions used, three character-
istics of workfare show up in both bodies of literature: 1) the obligation to work, that
is the need for beneﬁt recipients to seek work actively, accept every job oﬀer, and
participate in eventual job chances enhancing activities; 2) the strive for maximal
labour participation; and 3) minimal income protection provisions. Precisely, for a
welfare to workfare shift, the obligation to work should increase, there should be a
rise in measures that enhance labour participation, and income protection provisions
should be lowered.
Four concepts are particularly apt for gauging such changes: activation, generosity,
conditionality, and employment protection. Changes in the obligation to work show
up in expenditures on active labour market programmes (ALMP), that is spending on
public employment services and administration, labour market training, youth
measures, subsidized employment, and measures for the disabled (OECD 2001: 22),
because often – though not always – ALMP participants are forced to work (see
OECD 2003: chap. 4, Bruttel and Sol 2006). Three categories can aﬀect changes in
labour participation. First, activation because one of the primary goals of ALMP is to
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increase labour participation. Second, generosity because lower payments can
provide an incentive to take on a job instead of staying on welfare, consequently
increasing labour participation. Third, and ﬁnally, employment protection, that is the
regulations concerning hiring and ﬁring, especially regular procedural inconve-
niences, diﬃculty of dismissal, and notice and severance pay (OECD 1999: 50, 2004:
110–111), as lower protection reduces the employers’ costs for hiring workers and
may tune down the duration of spells of unemployment by positively aﬀecting the
unemployment exit rates (OECD 2004: 99).5 Changes in minimal income protection
provisions can develop from two categories: generosity and conditionality. Lower
generosity denotes ceteris paribus a drop in the importance of income protection
provisions such as unemployment beneﬁts. Similarly, stricter conditionality means
that the hurdle for getting such provisions rises.
Measuring the Degree of Workfare
How can we measure activation, generosity, conditionality, and employment
protection? This article measures the extent of activation by active spending per
unemployed person relative to gross domestic product (GDP) per person employed.
Active spending per unemployed person is the percentage of GDP spent on ALMP
for each 1 per cent standardized unemployment. This is a priori a better measure of
activation than the often used active spending as a share of GDP because spending
on labour market programmes usually increases with the level of unemployment
(OECD 2003: 193–194; see Armingeon 2005).6 A truly active orientation, however,
only arises if, in addition, active spending as a percentage of active and passive
spending on labour market programmes combined is relatively high (cf. Armingeon
2005), with passive spending being expenditures on unemployment beneﬁts and early
retirement schemes (OECD 2001: 22).
This article measures generosity by two components of Esping-Andersen’s
decommodiﬁcation index. First, by the net replacement rate, that is the ratio of
the net unemployment insurance beneﬁt to net income for an unmarried single
person earning the average production worker wage (Scruggs and Allan 2006) and,
second, by beneﬁt duration, that is the number of weeks a beneﬁt is payable for a
fully insured 40 year old in unemployment or sickness. These data come from a
recently publicized data set (Scruggs 2004; also see Scruggs and Allan 2006).
This article measures conditionality by two other components of the decom-
modiﬁcation index, again taken from Scruggs’ (2004) data set. First, by the number
of qualifying weeks, that is the number of weeks of insurance or employment
required to qualify for a beneﬁt and, second, by the number of waiting days, that is
the number of days before the beneﬁt starts.
Finally, the article measures employment protection by an index of the strictness of
employment protection legislation for temporary as well as for regular employment.
The index derives from 14 items of employment protection legislation and ranges
from 0 to 6, with a higher score indicating stronger protection, and reﬂects
principally the legislative rules but incorporates some aspects of contractual
provisions and judicial practices as well (OECD 1999: Annex 2B, 2004: Annex 2.A1).
To sum up, there are four concepts that relate (strongly) to the three
characteristics of workfare identiﬁed (that is, the obligation to work, maximal
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labour participation, and minimal income protection): activation, generosity,
conditionality, and employment protection. Although a diﬀerent operationalization
of workfare may produce diﬀerent ﬁndings, the operationalization proposed here is
the most appropriate one for assessing comparatively the predictions and ﬁndings of
the ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy analysts and the regulationists. Speciﬁcally, these
indicators capture the characteristics of workfare that the two strands of literature
share and data are available over a (relatively) long period of time. Before delving
into the empirics, the next section puts forward expectations about the welfare/
workfare changes in the diﬀerent welfare regimes.
Expected Welfare/Workfare Changes in the Welfare Regimes
If social policy change is regime-speciﬁc, as the ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy analysts
concur, there might be a welfare to workfare shift in some welfare regimes and none
in others. Recall that such a ﬁnding would at least partly contradict the
regulationists’ hypothesis because these scholars propose that a welfare to workfare
shift should be discernable in all welfare regimes. In order to assess whether the
presence of a welfare to workfare shift is regime dependent, I compare the regimes’
features in terms of work and welfare with the four concepts (that is, activation,
generosity, conditionality, and employment protection) relating to the characteristics
of workfare.
Both the existence of three welfare regimes (liberal, conservative, and social
democratic) and the categorization of countries in these regimes have been heavily
criticized (for recent critiques, see Goodin and Smitsman 2000, Bambra 2006,
Scruggs and Allan 2006). Yet, in light of the ﬁndings of a recent study (Vis 2007),
adopting the ‘‘classic’’ three-fold classiﬁcation makes sense. Focusing on indicators
similar to the ones concentrated on here (that is, activation, generosity, and
employment protection), Vis (2007) shows that most of this article’s countries have
membership of the ‘‘expected’’ welfare state regime in at least one of the two years,
and half of the countries even in both years.
Let us now turn to the welfare regimes’ characteristics. Features of the liberal
regime are residual social policy covering only the most basic risks, high levels of
employment, the absence of a focus on activation, and strongly deregulated labour
markets. Most of this regime’s policy heritages ﬁt the characteristics of workfare
identiﬁed above (see Pierson 2001: 432–440). The level of generosity is low, the
conditions attached to social policies are strict, and the level of employment
protection is low. In fact, the liberal regime would constitute a workfare regime if it
were not for the near absence of an emphasis on activation. Thus, if policy follows a
path dependent trajectory, the liberal regime likely displays a welfare to workfare
shift because of this regime’s close link with the characteristics of workfare.
Attributes of the conservative regime are its relatively generous, predominantly
insurance-based social policy aiming mainly at the male breadwinner, the –
consequent – discrepancy between ‘‘insiders’’ and ‘‘outsiders’’ on the labour market,
the high welfare tolls and low employment levels, the traditionally low importance of
activation, and the strongly regulated labour markets. Contrary to the liberal regime,
the conservative regime’s traditional policies do not ﬁt the characteristics of
workfare (see Pierson 2001: 445–454). The level of generosity in the conservative
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regime is high and the conditions aﬃxed are relatively moderate. Activation is hardly
stressed and the level of employment protection is high. If policy is path dependent,
there should be no welfare to workfare shift in this regime.
Features of the social democratic regime, ﬁnally, are its very generous, largely
universal social policy, its high levels of employment, the substantial use of active
labour market programmes and, with the exception of Denmark, the relatively
strongly regulated labour markets. Where the liberal regime clearly corresponds to
the characteristics of workfare and the conservative regime clearly does not, the
social democratic regime holds an intermediate position (see Pierson 2001: 439–445).
Contrary to the features of workfare, social policy in the social democratic regime is
generous and the conditions attached are relatively low. Still, the obligatory
character of most of the activation programmes suggests a focus on conditionality
that ﬁts workfare. The same goes for the high levels of employment that hint at an
obligation to work and for the deep emphasis on activation. However, the high level
of employment protection does not match workfare. Consequently, if policy is path
dependent, there should be no overall trend from welfare towards workfare. Still, the
extent of a welfare to workfare shift is probably higher than in the conservative
regime.
In sum, based on the welfare state regimes’ characteristics and their link with the
features of workfare, I expect the largest welfare to workfare shift in the liberal
regime, followed by no clear shift in the social democratic regime, and no shift at all
in the conservative regime.
Shifting towards Workfare?
Recall that for a welfare to workfare shift to take place, four conditions should be
met. Activation should increase, generosity should decline, conditionality should
rise, and employment protection should relax. Furthermore, for a development
towards activation, both active expenditure per person unemployed and ALMP
spending as a share of total labour market programmes’ expenditures should
increase. For lower generosity, the net replacement rates should be tuned down,
beneﬁt duration should be lowered, or both. For higher conditionality, the number
of qualifying weeks and/or waiting days should increase. And for relaxed
employment protection, the regulations concerning hiring and ﬁring should be
loosened, and/or dismissal should be easier, and/or notice and severance pay should
decline. This section assesses whether such changes took place and whether these
depended on the type of welfare regime, discussing the four conditions subsequently.
Activation
The cross-national and cross-regime variation in both active spending per
unemployed and as a share of labour market expenditure is substantial (see Table 1).
The conservative regime displays a clear pattern of increasing activation that is in
harmony with a trend towards workfare. On average, active spending per
unemployed rises by 122 per cent and active spending as a share of total spending
increases by 47 per cent. In fact, Switzerland is the only conservative country where
we see clear de-activation, that is a lowering of both measures.
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The trend in the social democratic regime is also clear. Here activation diminishes,
which is in dissonance with a shift towards workfare. More precisely, average active
spending per unemployed decreases by 25 per cent and active spending in total
spending falls by 2 per cent. Looking at the individual countries, we see that only
Denmark moves towards higher activation – and thus workfare – by raising active
spending per unemployed as well as active spending as a share of total spending.
Finland and Sweden, contrarily, are cases of de-activation as both types of active
spending fall. Norway, ﬁnally, also does not display a trend towards workfare as this
country slightly lowers active spending per unemployed whilst it increases active
spending in total spending.
Table 1. Spending on active labour market programmes
ALMP spending per
unemployed
ALMP spending in total
spending
1985 2002 Increase 1985 2002 Increase
Liberal regime
UK 7 7 0 26 50 92
Ireland 9 31 244 30 62 107
US 4 2 750 34 19 744
Canada 6 6 0 25 34 36
Australia 5 7 40 25 32 28
New Zealand 21 10 752 50 39 722
Averagea 9 11 22 32 39 22
(9) (6) (733)
Conservative regime
Austria 6 13 117 22 30 36
Belgium 12 18 50 28 34 21
France 7 14 100 22 40 82
Germany 8 14 75 32 36 13
Italy 3 5 67 37 74 100
the Netherlands 10 59 490 28 52 86
Switzerland 19 18 75 42 40 75
Average 9 20 122 30 44 47
Social democratic regime
Denmark 19 35 84 23 34 48
Finland 18 11 739 41 33 720
Norway 23 22 74 56 62 11
Sweden 68 27 760 71 57 720
Average 32 24 725 48 47 72
aAverage without Ireland between brackets.
Increase in percentages. Active spending per unemployed is computed as expenditures on
ALMP6100 divided by the standardized unemployment rate (cf. Armingeon 2005). Active
spending in total spending is calculated as active expenditures as a percentage of total
expenditures on labour market programmes. Data for Italy, 1995 instead of 1985; data for
Australia and Ireland, 2001 instead of 2002; data for Portugal, 2000 instead of 2002; data
ALMP in total spending for Canada, 1986 instead of 1985.
Source: Data set in Armingeon (2005 [standardized unemployment rates: OECD Labour
Market Statistics; ALMP expenditures: OECD 2004 Social Expenditure Database]);
increase and averages, author’s calculations.
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The liberal regime’s pattern regarding activation is less clear. On average, the
trend is towards activation with both measures increasing by 22 per cent. However,
excluding the huge rise in the Irish ALMP spending per unemployed of almost 250
per cent leads to a fall in the liberal regime’s average to minus 33 per cent. Two
liberal countries evidently display activation (Ireland and Australia), two de-
activation (the US and New Zealand), and the other two (the UK and Canada) show
no change in active spending per unemployed and an increase in active spending in
total spending.
All in all, a pattern of (further) activation emerges in all the countries of the
conservative welfare regime (except Switzerland), in Denmark, Ireland, and
Australia. Conversely, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, the US, and New Zealand
display de-activation. Furthermore, Norway shows lower active spending per
unemployed but higher active spending in total spending, and the UK and Canada
portray no change in active spending per unemployed but higher spending in total
spending. As activation should increase for a welfare to workfare shift, these ﬁndings
provide preliminary evidence for the inaccuracy of the regulationists’ hypothesis.
Generosity
For a welfare to workfare shift, the second category (generosity) should decline
between 1985 and 2002. Table 2 presents data on the ﬁrst generosity indicator, the
net replacement rate of unemployment insurance (UI) and sick pay, which indeed
shows a downward pattern. Ignoring the huge increase in the Italian UI replacement
rate of 2,100 per cent – caused by the increase from an extremely low replace-
ment rate of 2 in 1985, indicating the (almost) absence of unemployment insurance,
to a rate of 44 in 2002 – the average replacement rate falls in all regimes. The same
applies to most individual countries. In fact, only four countries deviate from that
pattern: Italy in which both UI and sick pay rates rise (the latter by 1% only),
Austria in which the sick pay rate increases, and France and Norway where the
replacement rates do not change. On average, the liberal regime’s replacement rates
display the largest change: minus 18 per cent for UI and minus 26 per cent for sick
pay. The average change is smallest in the conservative regime. Disregarding Italy
again, the average conservative UI rate falls by 1 per cent and the sick pay rate by 2
per cent. The social democratic regime holds an intermediate position with, on
average, minus 11 per cent for both UI and sick pay beneﬁts. So, and diﬀerent from
the data on activation, the changes in replacement rates support the regulationists’
hypothesis of a welfare to workfare shift for most countries. And despite the
diﬀerences in the extent of changes in the three regimes, these changes do take place
irrespective of the type of welfare regime – corroborating also the second part of the
regulationists’ thesis.
Beneﬁt duration, the second generosity indicator, displays no downward trend
that would be needed for a welfare to workfare shift. Speciﬁcally, seven countries do
not change their beneﬁt duration between 1985 and 2002 (Ireland, the US, Australia,
New Zealand, Germany, Italy, and Sweden). Four countries at least double the
duration of their unemployment beneﬁts (Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and
Norway). One country increases its sick pay duration (the UK). Four countries
reduce their unemployment beneﬁt duration somewhat or substantially (Canada,
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Denmark, Switzerland, and the UK). The same goes for three countries in case of
sick pay duration (Austria, Denmark, and France).
Combining the two generosity indicators, the pattern in most countries is towards
lower generosity, supporting the presence of a welfare to workfare shift (all countries
of the liberal regime, Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, and
Sweden, that is if we include those countries that exhibit a lowering of one indicator
and no change on the other). Conversely, four countries show a rise on one indicator
and a fall on the other, conﬂicting with a welfare to workfare shift.
Conditionality
For a welfare to workfare shift, the third category (conditionality) should show a
trend towards greater strictness between 1985 and 2002. The qualifying period, the
Table 2. Net replacement rates
Unemployment insurance Sick pay
1985 2002 Increase 1985 2002 Increase
Liberal regime
UK 25 19 724 29 22 724
Ireland 49 29 741 49 29 741
USa 64 58 79 7 7 7
Canada 66 60 79 66 60 79
Australia 27 26 74 31 21 732
New Zealand 34 26 724 40 26 735
Average 44 36 718 43 32 726
Conservative regime
Austria 58 55 75 76 79 4
Belgium 71 66 77 87 85 72
France 71 70 71 62 62 0
Germany 63 60 75 100 92 78
Italy 2 44 2100 76 77 1
the Netherlands 86 78 79 84 78 77
Switzerland 73 72 71 82 79 74
Averageb 61
(70)
64
(69)
5
(71)
81 79 72
Social democratic regime
Denmark 74 59 719 74 59 720
Finland 64 57 711 87 72 717
Norway 67 65 73 100 100 0
Sweden 81 75 77 92 82 711
Average 72 64 711 88 78 711
aThe US has no sickness programme.
bAverage without Italy between brackets.
Increase in percentages. The replacement rate is the ratio of net unemployment insurance
beneﬁt to net income for an unmarried single person earning the average production worker
(APW) wage.
Source: Scruggs (2004); increase and averages, author’s calculations.
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ﬁrst conditionality indicator, fails to demonstrate such an upward pattern. Actually,
only three countries tighten their conditions by increasing the qualifying period
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Finland; all for UI). Four countries, contrarily, relax
the conditions by lowering the qualifying period for UI (Ireland, Canada, Germany,
and Switzerland). The UK increases the qualifying period of UI and lowers it for sick
pay. Most countries display no change at all (the US, Australia, New Zealand,
Austria, France, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). Nonetheless, the regime
averages suggest some patterns. The changes in the liberal regime are towards
fewer conditions, that is lower qualifying periods. The only change in the social
democratic regime, however, is an increase in the qualifying period. Finally, the
changes in the conservative regime entail both increasing qualifying periods and
decreasing ones.
For the number of waiting days, the second conditionality indicator, only a few
countries display any change between 1985 and 2002. Two countries show a trend
towards stricter conditions on this category: Switzerland, increasing the number of
waiting days for UI, and New Zealand, increasing sick pay waiting days. In six
countries, conditions become less strict (Finland and Italy lower their UI
waiting days; Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK lower their sick pay waiting
days; and Ireland lowers both). Most countries, however, do not change their
waiting days (the US, Canada, Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Norway, and Sweden).
All in all, most countries do not display a trend towards stricter conditions. The
qualifying period increases in four countries only and the number of waiting days in
two. Some countries lower their qualifying period and number of waiting days,
meaning fewer conditions. Most countries, however, do not change the qualifying
period and the number of waiting days between 1985 and 2002. This latter ﬁnding
fails to corroborate the regulationists’ hypothesis.
Employment Protection
Finally, for a welfare to workfare shift, employment protection (the fourth category)
should be reduced. Table 3 presents data on employment protection for both regular
and temporary employment for the late 1980s and 2003,7 which display a distinct
cross-regime pattern. On average, the liberal regime’s employment protection
becomes stricter both for regular and, especially, temporary employment (respec-
tively plus 30% and 50%). All the liberal countries demonstrating any change (the
UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) show this increase. The social
democratic regime, contrarily, on average reduces employment protection for both
regular and, particularly, temporary employment (respectively minus 8% and 33%).
Also the conservative regime lowers average employment protection for temporary
employment (minus 35%), whilst the average employment protection for regular
employment remains the same. Here, however, some countries increase protection
between the late 1980s and 2003 (France and Germany for regular employment;
Switzerland for temporary employment).
Overall, and in line with a welfare to workfare shift, employment protection
relaxes in all countries of the social democratic and conservative regimes (except
Switzerland). In the liberal regime, conversely, employment protection increases.
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Discussion of Results
This leaves us with the question, who is right? The ‘‘mainstream’’ comparative social
policy analysts holding that radical social policy change is absent and that the
changes that do take place are regime-speciﬁc? Or the regulationists arguing that
there is a radical shift from welfare towards workfare that takes place irrespective of
the type of welfare state regime? This article’s ﬁndings indicate that the situation is
most aptly described as a ‘‘tie’’.
If we take the predictions from the social policy literature and regulation literature
in the strictest sense, both are oﬀ-beam. The ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy scholars’
predictions are inadequate because substantial changes occur that, certainly when
combined, are radical as they break with the established trajectory. A good example
thereof is the trend towards greater employment protection in the liberal regime. The
regulationists’ predictions are wrong because no single country meets all four criteria
for a radical change towards workfare (higher activation, lower generosity, stricter
conditionality, and relaxed employment protection). Since all criteria are essential
Table 3. Strictness of employment protection regulation
Regular employment Temporary employment
Late 1980s 2003 Increase Late 1980s 2003 Increase
Liberal regime
UK 0.9 1.2 33 0.3 0.4 33
Ireland 1.6 1.6 0 0.3 0.6 100
US 0.2 0.2 0 0.3 0.3 0
Canada 0.9 1.3 44 0.3 0.3 0
Australia 1.0 1.5 50 0.9 0.9 0
New Zealand 1.4 1.7 21 0.4 1.3 225
Average 1.0 1.3 30 0.4 0.6 50
Conservative regime
Austria 2.9 2.4 717 1.8 1.5 717
Belgium 1.7 1.7 0 4.6 2.6 743
France 2.3 2.5 9 3.1 3.6 16
Germany 2.6 2.7 4 3.8 1.8 753
Italy 1.8 1.8 0 5.4 2.1 761
the Netherlands 3.1 3.1 0 2.4 1.2 750
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 0 0.9 1.1 22
Average 2.2 2.2 0 3.1 2.0 735
Social democratic regime
Denmark 1.5 1.5 0 2.6 1.4 746
Finland 2.8 2.2 721 1.9 1.9 0
Norway 2.3 2.3 0 3.5 2.9 717
Sweden 2.9 2.9 0 4.1 1.6 761
Average 2.4 2.2 78 3.0 2.0 733
Increase in percentages. The scores rank from0 tot 6, a higher score indicating stricter regulation.
For calculation of these scores, see OECD (1999: Annex 2B) and OECD (2004: Annex 2.A1).
Data for New Zealand, late 1990s instead of late 1980s.
Source: OECD (2004: Table 2.A2.4); increase and averages, author’s calculations.
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for such a change, this ﬁnding denotes that such a welfare to workfare shift failed to
come about.
However, adopting a leaner criterion might be justiﬁable as for all welfare regimes
ﬁndings are incongruous for the indicator conditionality. In the social democratic
regime, for example, the average qualifying period increases – in line with a welfare
to workfare shift – but the number of waiting days decreases – contrary to a welfare
to workfare shift. Does a shift towards workfare come about if the conditionality
category is disregarded? Yes, to a certain extent it does. The conservative regime on
average displays a welfare to workfare shift as activation, generosity, and
employment protection all have the ‘‘correct’’ sign. In addition, in all conservative
countries save Switzerland all criteria but one at the most are in the right direction,
suggesting the presence of a welfare to workfare shift in this regime. This conclusion
does not apply to the liberal and social democratic regimes. Here, one indicator
exhibits an ‘‘incorrect’’ sign, respectively employment protection and activation. The
within-regime variation in these regimes is larger than in the conservative regime. In
the social democratic regime, Denmark displays a welfare–workfare shift, Sweden
would have if it were not for the lower activation, and Finland and Norway are not
shifting as they have the wrong sign on two categories. Half of the countries of the
liberal regime (the UK, Ireland, and Australia) have one category with an incorrect
sign and the other half (the US, Canada, and New Zealand) have two. These ﬁndings
provide a weak basis to speak of an overall trend towards workfare.
This result brings me to the second element in the predictions of the two approaches:
the extent to which changes are regime-speciﬁc. Are the comparative social policy
scholars right and are the changes path dependent? If the trajectory is path dependent,
the liberal regime should display the strongest shift towards workfare, followed by the
social democratic regime and, in the last position, no change in the conservative regime
(see above). Before examining whether the data demonstrate this pattern, let me
mention one caveat. As the empirical analysis focuses on changes, countries and
regimes corresponding most with the characteristics of workfare to begin with (like the
liberal regime) may be contended to be the least likely candidates for a welfare to
workfare shift. However, I have taken this possible problem into account by primarily
concentrating on the direction of change (that is, on the indicators’ signs), whilst
considering the degree of change only of secondary importance.
The empirical analysis reveals that the actual changes fail to support the
hypotheses: the conservative regime demonstrates a welfare to workfare shift, the
social democratic regime holds the intermediate position as only Denmark moves
from welfare to workfare, and the liberal regime corresponds least with a welfare to
workfare shift. This interesting ﬁnding solicits further investigation. It might, for
example, mean that social policies are converging. However, whereas the data on
activation and employment protection (see Tables 1 and 3) hint in that direction,
those on generosity (see Table 2) do not.
Concerning the regime speciﬁcity of changes, the ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy
analysts are right. The presence of a welfare to workfare shift characterizes the
conservative regime (and Denmark); the rise of employment protection typiﬁes the
liberal regime (and Switzerland); the presence of changes on (almost) all indictors
characterizes the social democratic regime; and lower activation (one or both
indicators) is speciﬁc to the liberal and social democratic regimes (and Switzerland).
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Conclusion
This article has used the predictions and ﬁndings of so-called ‘‘mainstream’’ social
policy analysis and the regulation literature to examine the direction and scope of
social policy change in 17 advanced capitalist democracies between 1985 and 2002.
Speciﬁcally, the article put forward an innovative operationalization of workfare
(based on the indicators activation, generosity, conditionality, and employment
protection) that allowed for assessing systematically the analytical predictions of
each strand of literature. The empirical analysis presented mixed ﬁndings. Contrary
to the social policy analysts’ predictions, radical changes occurred and those changes
did not follow a clear path dependent trajectory. Contrary to the regulationists’
predictions, there was no overall trend from welfare towards workfare irrespective of
the type of welfare regime. However, the regime-speciﬁc pattern of changes veriﬁed
(partially) the social policy analysts’ hypotheses, and the welfare to workfare shift in
the conservative regime and in Denmark corroborated (partially) the regulationists’
predictions.
What can we take from this article’s ﬁndings regarding the wider debate on
welfare state change? What do the results suggest with respect to the welfare state’s
alleged ‘‘hollowing out’’ (see Cox 1998a, Gilbert 2002), ‘‘retrenchment’’ (see Korpi
and Palme 2003, Allan and Scruggs 2004), or ‘‘persistency’’ (see Pierson 1996, 2001,
Huber and Stephens 2001, Castles 2004)?
In brief, the answer is that the ﬁndings presented here fail to substantiate any of
these assertions fully. At odds with the idea of a hollowed out or retrenched welfare
state are the on average increase in active spending per unemployed in the liberal and
conservative (but not social democratic) regimes, the fact that most countries either
expand the duration of unemployment and/or sickness beneﬁts or leave them
unaltered, the absence of higher qualifying periods and waiting days for these
beneﬁts in most countries, and the improvement of employment protection in the
liberal regime. These outcomes suggest instead that the welfare state persists.
However, there are indications of welfare state cutback or retrenchment, particularly
the lowering of the replacement rates of unemployment insurance and sick pay that
occurred in all countries under study. The relaxation of employment protection in
most countries of the conservative and social democratic regimes, and the reduced
emphasis on activation in the latter, suggest that policy changes may be more than
‘‘bounded change’’ – as the advocates of path dependency would have it. These
ﬁndings substantiate the notion prominently present in the comparative social policy
literature that how to conceptualize and operationalize the dependent variable is
crucially important (see Green-Pedersen 2004, Ku¨hner 2007).
The idea of a hollowed out welfare state does often not, or not only, refer to less
spending on welfare state arrangements. Instead, the focus is regularly (also) on the
quality of the welfare state. What, for example, is the eﬀect of social policy changes
on the rights and responsibilities of citizens? In this respect, workfare programmes
are particularly interesting. Although this article demonstrated that welfare states
have not univocally transformed into workfare regimes, workfare programmes are
adopted (almost) everywhere. Given the characteristics of such programmes (the
compulsory nature, the stress on labour participation, and the striving for minimal
income protection provisions), this may very well be a change for the worse.
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The debate about the virtues and vices of workfare programmes is still unresolved.
Programmes of the so-called Work First type that aim to place participants in a job
as quickly as possible can be a stepping-stone helping individuals into employment,
that is when the demand on the labour market is suﬃciently high (Peck and
Theodore 2000, Bruttel and Sol 2006: 85). This can be an improvement (but see
Malmberg-Heimomen and Vuori 2005). However, if workfare programmes simply
force people to take on jobs without oﬀering anything in return (like training or skill
development), they can change the rights and obligations accruing to members of
society for the worse – in that sense ‘‘hollowing out’’ the welfare state (see Cox
1998a, Gilbert 2002, Dwyer 2004). Such hollowing out does not necessarily take
place when programmes follow the so-called Human Capital Development model
that focuses on the development of social attitudes and marketable skills that
enhance individuals’ ability to ﬁnd a job (Lødemel and Trickey 2001, Peck and
Theodore 2001, Bruttel and Sol 2006: 70). Generally speaking, the workfare
programmes in the Anglo-Saxon countries are Work First ones, whereas the
programmes in the countries in the conservative and social democratic regimes are
usually of the Human Capital Development type (but see Bruttel and Sol 2006). This
suggests that the adoption of workfare programmes ‘‘hollows out’’ further the –
already quite lean – liberal welfare states, whilst the workfare programmes in the
conservative and social democratic regimes do not have this eﬀect.
This article’s ﬁndings bring forth all kind of questions that solicit further study.
How, for example, can we explain the changes found in the individual countries and
welfare regimes, as well as the substantial cross-national and cross-regime variation
in the pattern of changes? This study demonstrated that confronting the predictions
and ﬁndings of the ‘‘mainstream’’ social policy literature and the regulation
approach provides a fruitful ﬁrst step in this endeavour.
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Notes
1. For a conceptualization of welfare rooted in culture, see Bartram (2005).
2. Both the KWS and the SWR are seen as regulatory structures for managing the capital/labour
relationship. The KWS aims for full employment and the generalization of mass consumption and mass
production and therefore maintains a large social security programme. The SWR, contrarily, strives to
stimulate innovation and ﬂexibility and to subordinate social policy to the demands put forward by the
new post industrialist system such as the necessity to improve competitiveness.
3. The cases are the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (liberal
regime); Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland (conservative regime);
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden (social democratic regime). These countries are selected because
the literature dealing with workfare focuses on these countries (and not, for example, the Southern
European countries).
4. The years 1985 and 2002 are the earliest and latest years for which data are available for all components
of the workfare measure.
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5. However, leaner employment protection means lower job security, which may trigger some people to
prefer welfare over work (see Regalia 2003: 180–181).
6. Thanks to Klaus Armingeon for kindly providing these data.
7. Due to data availability, I measure employment protection for the late 1980s and 2003 instead of for
1985 and 2002. This causes no problems for the analysis because the regulationists consider the welfare
to workfare shift to be a fairly recent phenomenon.
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